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Non-traditional retailers such as warehouse club stores, discount drug stores, and discount
mass merchandisers are new competitors for traditional food retailers.  It is expected that non-
traditional retailers will account for roughly 14 percent of total grocery sales by the turn of the
century.  The impact of a particular discount mass merchandiser (Wal-Mart) on the sales of a
conventional retail grocery outlet (David’s Supermarket, Inc.) located in the rural areas surrounding
the Dallas/Ft. Worth metroplex is analyzed in this case study.  In this case study, Wal-Mart alone is
responsible for about a 17 percent reduction in sales.
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New Competition for Supermarkets: A Case Study
Background
Non-traditional grocery outlets have grown noticeably in the past few years.  These outlets
include warehouse club stores, deep discount drug stores, and discount mass merchandisers.
Although, these non-traditional retailers do not typically offer a comparable array of grocery food and
non-food products found in supermarkets, they do market specific high-volume categories of dry
grocery products, paper products, frozen foods, limited perishable produce and meat products, health
and personal care products, and general merchandise.  Low-operating margins provide a low-price
appeal to consumers while ensuring high-volume shipments by suppliers.
Do non-traditional grocery retailers provide a source of competition to traditional food
retailers?  According to a survey of 2,300 food chain store managers conducted by Progressive
Grocer in 1992, this question is of utmost importance to food retailers.  Evidence for concern on the
part of the traditional food retailers is exhibited in Figure 1, a look at sales of grocery products by
warehouse club stores and supercenters (Kaufman).  Club stores currently account for a major share
of non-traditional grocery sales, registering $21.4 billion in 1993 and $22.6 billion in 1994.  Club
stores are projected to reach about $37 billion by the turn of the century.  Supercenter formats such
as those in operation by Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and Target, had sales of $5.1 billion and $6.7 billion
respectively in 1993 and 1994.  Projections of sales from supercenter formats range from $9.5 billion
in 1995 to $32.6 billion in 2000 (Kaufman).  According to a Food Marketing Institute (FMI) report
on alternative store formats, nontraditional retail outlets accounted for 6.2 percent of all grocery
related sales in 1991.  The combined grocery products sales of non-traditional retailers is forecastedFigure 1.  Grocery Products Sales by Non-traditional Retailers
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to reach almost $70 billion in 2000 — amounting to roughly 14 percent of total grocery product
sales.  Most of the growth of non-traditional outlets has occurred over the past 10 years.
Warehouse club stores primarily serve consumers who buy in bulk.  A FMI study concluded
that prices for grocery-related items averaged 26 percent lower in these stores than in traditional
grocery stores (Food Marketing Review).  Grocery-related products are one of the fastest growing
segments of deep discount drugstores such as Phar-Mor, Drug Emporium, and F&M.  Mass
merchandisers have extended their product lines to expand the array of food and non-food grocery
products in supercenter formats.  Both mass merchandisers and warehouse club stores use locational
and product mix strategies to obtain greater sales volume.  To illustrate, mass merchandisers have
developed their supercenter formats in low-density, rural areas where large-scale competitors are
essentially non-existent.  Three retailers, Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and Target, account for roughly 70
percent of total sales from discount mass merchandisers (Food Marketing Review). 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of one mass merchandiser (Wal-Mart) on
the sales of a traditional retail grocery outlet (David’s Supermarket, Inc.) located in the rural areas
surrounding the Dallas/Ft. Worth metroplex.  To date, no studies have quantified the magnitude of
the effect of mass merchandisers on sales of traditional grocery retailers.  In this way, this paper
makes a contribution to the literature.  Data for this analysis correspond to the 30 stores from David’s
Supermarket, Inc. covering monthly periods from 1987 to 1994.  These data indeed are proprietary
and come from the accounting firm of Coopers and Lybrand, LLP.4
Model Specification
This analysis rests on the development of an econometric model for retail grocery sales.  As
mentioned previously, sales correspond to those from David’s Supermarket, Inc. over the period
1987 to 1994.  This firm consists of 30 stores located on the rural/urban fringe in the Dallas/Ft. Worth
area.  A list of the various stores, together with their competitors, is exhibited in Table 1.  The
locations of the various stores are circled on the map given in Figure 2.
From Table 1, the principal competitor for David’s Supermarket, Inc., clearly is Wal-Mart.
Competition from Wal-Mart is evident in 22 of the 30 stores listed in Table 1.  Competition also is
evident from local traditional food competitors.  In this analysis, attention is centered on measuring
the impact of the presence of Wal-Mart on sales from David’s Supermarket, Inc., after accounting
for other factors.  
To accomplish this task, we employ the following model specification:
SALES  = f(SEASONALITY, STORE, POPULATION DENSITY , it i it
INCOME , WAL-MART , NCOMP , SALES , LBO), where it it it it-1 t
SALES  = grocery sales of store i in time period t; it
SEASONALITY = set of dummy variables corresponding to particular months (base month,
December);
STORE = dummy variable corresponding to store i (base store, store 30); i
POPULATION DENSITY  = population of the city in which store i is located divided by the it
square miles of the county in which store i is located;5





1 Grandview Johnson Wal-Mart (1/87 to 12/94) Grandview Fast Stop
2 Alvarado Johnson Wal-Mart (1/89 to 12/94) Level Food Center, Inc.
3 Midlothian Ellis Wal-Mart (1/87 to 12/94) DJC Food Stores, Inc.
Minyard Food Stores, Inc.
Kroger
4 Mabank Kaufman Wal-Mart (1/94 to 12/94) none
Winn-Dixie
5, 10 Cleburn Johnson HEB Osborne Grocery Co.
Kroger Pedgos West
Winn-Dixie
6 Granbury Hood Kroger Circle B
Winn-Dixie Circle Eight Enterprises
7 Whitney Hill Wal-Mart (1/87 to 12/94) Bonanza Supermarket
Randall Lee Wood
8 Clifton  Bosque none Thrift Mart Food Stores
9 Seven Navarro Wal-Mart (1/94 to 12/94) Kemp-Tex Inc.
Points Winn-Dixie Lively Grocery
11 Hamilton Hamilton none Level Food Center, Inc.
12 McGregor McLennan Wal-Mart (1/87 to 12/94) Triad Foods, Inc.
13 Italy Ellis Wal-Mart (1/87 to 12/94) none
14 Temple Bell HEB Mayer’s Food Mart
Albertson’s FJR, Inc.
Wal-Mart (1/87 to 9/92) E-Z Way Convenience
Stores





16 Stephenville Erath HEB Osborne Grocery Co.
Winn-Dixie
Wal-Mart (8/91 to 6/93)
17 Glen Rose Somervell none Level Food Center, Inc.
18 Mineral Palo Pinto Wal-Mart (11/87 to 12/94) CS Food Stores
Wells Winn-Dixie Diamond Food Markets,
Inc.
Sam’s Supermarket
19 Corsicana Navarro Wal-Mart (7/88 to 5/89) Fullerton Grocery &
HEB Market
20 Joshua Johnson none B&W Grocery
Level Food Center, Inc.
21 Little Elm Denton Wal-Mart (4/89 to 12/94) none
22 Frisco Collin Wal-Mart (4/89 to 4/94) none
23 Princeton Collin Wal-Mart (7/93 to 12/94) Gilbert Food Store, Inc.
24 Whitesboro Cooke Wal-Mart (5/90 to 12/94) Clinnons Grocery, Inc.
North Town Foods
25 Gainesville Cooke Wal-Mart (9/90 to 6/92) Scivally’s Grocery
Randall’s Dicus Cash Super Market,
Piggly Wiggly Inc.
26 Ferris Ellis Wal-Mart (10/91 to 12/94) Averett & Associates, Inc.
27 Graham Young Wal-Mart (9/91 to 5/92) United Supermarkets, Inc.
28 Celina Collin Wal-Mart (8/92 to 10/94) none
29 Pottsboro Grayson Wal-Mart (6/93 to 12/94) none
30 Everman Tarrant Wal-Mart (7/93 to 12/94) none
Minyard Food Stores, Inc.8
INCOME  = per capita income in time period t of the county in which store i is located; it
WAL-MART  = 1 if Wal-Mart is a competitor for store i in time period t; 0 otherwise; it
NCOMP  = number of other competitors for store i in time period t; it
SALES  = lagged grocery sales of store i in time period t; and it-1
LBO = 1 if time period after January 1990; 0 otherwise. t
The model links seasonality, store characteristics, population density, income, the presence
of Wal-Mart, the number of other competitors, lagged sales, and a structural change associated with
a leveraged buyout (LBO) to retail grocery sales of David’s Supermarket, Inc.  The LBO took place
in February 1990; a LBO is the purchase of the common stock of a company through debt-financing,
while pledging with the assets of the new company as collateral.
Given the availability of monthly data, it is possible to examine whether or not seasonality is
evident in sales of this retail outlet.  The individual stores are in different locations, may possess
different characteristics, and may cater to different clientele.  To account for differences among
stores, we employ dummy variables corresponding to the various stores.  All other things held
constant, grocery sales are likely to be higher for more densely populated areas.  As well, grocery
sales are likely to be positively related to per capita income.  Further, sales from this firm are expected
to be negatively impacted by the presence of Wal-Mart; in addition, as the number of other
competitors increases, sales are expected to decline.  We examine whether or not the LBO influences
sales of this retail outlet.  Finally, to capture customer loyalty, we include the lag of grocery stores.
The use of a lagged dependent variable typically is associated with habit persistence.  As such, we
expect the estimated coefficient associated with this variable to be between 0 and 1.  9
Data
Data for this analysis cover monthly time periods from 1987 to 1994 for 30 stores from
David’s Supermarket, Inc.  Not all stores have complete information over the period 1987 to 1994.
Several stores closed before 1994, and several stores opened after 1987.  The total number of
observations available for analysis is 1989.
Descriptive statistics for selected variables in the econometric specification are exhibited in
Table 2.  Sales, on average, are $283,520 per month, ranging from $103,460 to $793,230 per month.
Population density is 116,280 persons per square mile on average, with a range of 8,920 to 1,418,200
people per square mile.  Per capita income on average is $16,596 over this period, with a range of
$11,258 to $26,805.  Wal-Mart is a competitor for 22 of the 30 stores in the firm.  But, over this
period the presence of Wal-Mart occurs just over 50 percent of the time.  Besides, Wal-Mart, the
average number of competitors to any store in David’s Supermarket, Inc. is close to 2 with a range
of 0 to 6.
Empirical Results
The econometric specification corresponds to a pooled time-series cross-sectional model.
Given unequal numbers of monthly time periods within each of the 30 cross-sections (stores), the
model technically is an analysis of covariance model.  The estimation technique is simply ordinary
least squares.  The estimated coefficients and t-statistics associated with each of the variables in the
model are exhibited in Table 3.  The level of significance chosen in this analysis is 0.05.  All variables
in the model are statistically significant except for per capita income and the number of other
competitors besides Wal-Mart.10
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables in the Model
VARIABLE MEAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM
STANDARD
DEVIATION
SALES $283,520 $96,398 $103,460 $793,230
POPDENSE 116,280 151,020 8,920 1,418,200
INCOME $16,597 $3,277 $11,258 $26,805
WAL-MART 0.51 0.49 0 1
NCOMP 1.73 1.44 0 6
About 83 percent of the variability in retail grocery sales is accounted for by the model.
Seasonality is evident in sales.  Sales are highest in December; differences between the remaining
months and December range from $5,465 (March) to $104,950 (January).  In addition, differences
in sales exist across stores.  Differences between sales from other stores and store 30 (base category)
vary from $267,850 (store 28) to $466,170 (store 7).  Relative to store 30, sales from all remaining
stores are higher.
Population density is a statistically significant factor affecting retail grocery sales.  For every
1000 person change per square mile, sales change by $290 for this firm.  Income, on the other hand,
is not a statistically important factor, affecting sales of David’s Supermarket, Inc.  The sign associated
with this variable also is negative, implying that as per capita income of consumers increases,
shoppers may switch to other grocery outlets or shoppers may increase expenditures in the away-
from-home market.
The presence of Wal-Mart is a key factor affecting sales.  Sales from this firm are $47,692 per
month less with Wal-Mart as a competitor than without the presence of this mass merchandiser.
Given that average monthly sales for David’s Supermarket, Inc. over the time period 1987 to 199411
are $283,520, Wal-Mart alone, ceteris paribus, is responsible for about a 17 percent reduction in
sales.  Thus, the presence of Wal-Mart is a noteworthy concern to this firm.  The number of other
competitors does negatively impact sales from David’s Supermarket, Inc., but this impact is not
statistically significant.  For every unit change in the number of other competitors besides Wal-Mart,
sales change by about $6,386 per month in the opposite direction.
The structural change attributed to the leveraged buyout also is a key factor affecting sales
of this retail outlet.  Sales for this firm are lower by $20,827 after the LBO compared to before the
LBO.  The LBO, alone, is responsible for about a 7 percent reduction in sales on average.  Finally,
the coefficient associated with lagged sales is in the unit interval (0.5815).  This coefficient also is
statistically different from zero.  Thus, all other factors held constant, there appears to be customer
loyalty or habit persistence in sales.
Concluding Remarks
Non-traditional retailers such as warehouse club stores, deep discount drug stores, and mass
merchandisers indeed are new competitors for traditional food retailers.  It is expected that non-
traditional retailers will account for roughly 14 percent of total grocery product sales by the turn of
the century.  According to Kinsey and Senauer, traditional supermarkets are not only facing serious
competitive challenges from club stores, drug stores, and mass merchandisers at the price-conscious
end of the market but also from home-meal replacement providers at the convenience-oriented end.
Indeed hypermarkets and convenience stores also are formidable competitors to traditional grocery
outlets.12


























































R  = .8353
2
 * indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 14
In this paper, the impact of a discount mass merchandiser (Wal-Mart) on the sales of a
conventional retail grocery outlet (David’s Supermarket, Inc.) located in the rural areas surrounding
the Dallas/Ft. Worth metroplex was analyzed.  In this case study, it was estimated that Wal-Mart
alone is responsible for about a 17 percent reduction in sales.  This result supports the contention that
mass merchandisers (supercenters) are a notable source of competition to traditional food retailers.
Projections of sales in the year 2000 from mass merchandisers using supercenter formats are
in the $30 billion to $35 billion range, up from $10 billion currently.  Supercenters are the prime retail
growth vehicle, ranging in size from 100,000 to 200,000 square feet.  They contain a complete
discount general merchandise outlet and a large-scale, low-price supermarket under one roof.  The
theory that people won’t shop for food and fashion merchandise at the same time apparently does not
hold water.
Club stores are projected to reach about $40 billion by the turn of the century, up from about
$25 billion currently.  Slower growth then is expected in warehouse clubs compared to mass
merchandisers.  The clubs expanded so rapidly that there exists, at present, cannibalization among
club stores.  Due in part to the “efficient consumer response” (ECR) initiative, traditional
supermarkets are now generally more competitive with warehouse clubs.
What implications can we draw from this paper?  Traditional grocery outlets will face
heightened competition from mass merchants like Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and Target and at the same
time, but to a lesser degree, from warehouse club and discount drug stores.  Notable losers in terms
of share of sales as a result of this competition are the superettes, mom and pop stores, and specialty
food retailers.  To stabilize market share, traditional grocery outlets must make full use of the ECR
initiative, especially in efforts to reduce prices and yet maintain profit margins.  Also, the supermarket
industry is highly unionized, and consequently, labor costs are high.  Most mass merchandisers, on15
the other hand, have a non-union labor force.  In order to lower their cost structure and improve their
competitive position vis-à-vis K-Mart, Wal-Mart, and Target, supermarket companies must take
tougher stances in union negotiations.
Additional research in this area will be of benefit to help us predict the future direction of the
food system.  Additional research will help in the understanding of the changes that are occurring in
the way retail establishments deliver food to consumers.16
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